The Divergence of Binary Sex and the Transgender by Pittman, Kelsey Marie
Liberty University Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3 Article 7
September 2018
The Divergence of Binary Sex and the Transgender
Kelsey Marie Pittman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact
scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pittman, Kelsey Marie (2018) "The Divergence of Binary Sex and the Transgender," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 12 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol12/iss3/7
NOTE 
THE DIVERGENCE OF BINARY SEX AND THE 
TRANSGENDER 
Kelsey Marie Pittman† 
ABSTRACT 
While the overarching and popular thought in the United States has been 
that a person’s sex is either male or female, in recent years, this principle has 
been shaken to its core. There has been heightened awareness of 
transgender persons whose inner gender has grown to become the opposite 
of that person’s biological sex. The transgender community has watched the 
masses become open to the idea that a person could have the biology of one 
sex and the gender of another. This apparent acceptance has become a 
catapult for the transgender community to express their inner gender 
through manifestations of that gender. While there has been monumental 
support for transgender rights in the law, there has also been considerable 
push-back. This has led to lawsuits wherein the court system must now 
determine if it will open its arms to the transgender community. During 
these primordial stages of the intersection between the law and transgender 
rights, the courts must determine how the law should evolve so that it can 
appropriately accommodate the transgender person, as well as the general 
public.  
Many transgender people argue for a legal definition of sex that is 
determined by gender identity. Many transgender advocates argue for a 
legal definition of sex that is determined by gender identity, rather than 
biological sex, in order to access the restroom that matches their inner 
gender. Courts wrestle with the issue of whether the legal definition of sex 
should be defined by gender identity.  
This Note will focus on the legal definition of sex and argue that the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Niemeyer in Grimm v. Gloucester was correct in 
reasoning that the definition of sex should remain the physiological 
distinctions between males and females.  
Grimm v. Gloucester involved a suit by a young woman who sought 
access to the restroom that matched her gender identity rather than her 
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biological sex. This Note will seek to resolve this issue by arguing that there 
is a way that the law can accommodate both the concerns of the transgender 
and the collective public. Instead of merely shifting the burden onto the 
transgender individual, or the collective public, a balanced approach can 
both protect the transgender and allow the legal definition of sex to remain 
as the physiological distinctions between males and females.  
To achieve this balanced approach, transgender should be considered as a 
legally recognized branch of sex. A legally recognizable transgender should be 
characterized and defined as having physiological distinctions separate from, 
and opposed to, those of males and females. This Note argues that in order to 
be a legally recognized and protected transgender under law, a person must 
either have a skewed chromosome count, have sex reassignment surgery, be 
intersex, or have any other physiological difference excluding a person from 
fitting into either category of male or female.  
If the law were to recognize this definition of the transgender and keep 
the traditional definition of sex, the culture war over restrooms and other 
transgender rights would draw closer to resolution. The status of 
transgender would no longer be based solely on a person’s subjective beliefs 
of gender identity. This would abrogate uncertainty and speculation in a 
variety of legal situations, such as when a court decides a case based on 
transgender rights, when a jury must render a verdict on whether a person 
identified with a specific gender at a certain time, or when a person is 
simply seeking to avoid the unlawful conduct of accessing a restroom built 
for a specific gender.  
This Note proposes a two-step analysis in determining whether a 
transgender person has a right to access a restroom that is in accord with 
gender identity. The courts must first determine whether the person is a 
legally recognized transgender. Second, the courts must determine whether 
the transgender person’s injury is sufficient to provide standing in court. 
This framework must be viewed through the lens of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (I.I.E.D) because the policy underlying this 
cause of action applies to transgender rights—i.e., the court should not have 
to decide cases where the injury to the plaintiff is hurt feelings alone. 
Through this analysis, the transgender person will have the right to access 
the restroom that matches their gender identity and the public would retain 
the historical separation of restrooms by physiological distinctions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term gender identity was first used in the United States in a press release 
on November 21, 1966, to announce the new clinic for transsexuals at the Johns 
Hopkins Hospital.1 The term has now become a regular part of American 
vocabulary.2 The terms transsexual and transgender are used synonymously to 
articulate a state in which the apparent gender (determined at birth) of a person 
does not match the subjective gender.3 Medical research suggests that the cause 
of this incongruence of apparent and subjective gender could be due to 
“exposure . . . to the ‘wrong’ hormones during the development of the brain, 
such that the anatomic physical body and the brain develop in different gender 
paths.”4 This incongruence between body and mind ultimately may cause the 
mental disorder of gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria.5 To suppress 
the effects of gender dysphoria, transgender persons often seek to live their lives 
in conformity with their subjective gender.6 This includes dressing, speaking, 
and acting in accordance with the transgender person’s gender identity.7 To 
fully act in accord with one’s gender identity, many transgender people believe 
that they must use the restroom of the sex that matches their gender identity; 
this restroom use has become a flashpoint for legal disputes.8 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. J. Money, The concept of gender identity disorder in childhood and adolescence after 
39 years., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7996589 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
 2. See, e.g., Transsexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/transsexual. 
 3. What is the Difference Between Transgender And Transsexual?, TRANS-AWARENESS 
PROJECT, http://www.transawareness.org/what-is-the-difference-between-transgender-and-
transsexual.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017); Prabhat S., Difference between Transgender and 
Transsexual, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN.NET, 
http://www.differencebetween.net/science/difference-between-transgender-and-transsexual/ 
(last visited on Sept. 16, 2017). 
 4. CHRISTINE MICHELLE DUFFY, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 16-77 (2014). 
 5. The disorder is sometimes accompanied by a desire to change one's anatomic features to 
conform physically with one's perception of self through hormone therapy, surgery, or 
psychological counseling. They may also choose to live in their preferred gender role by dressing, 
naming, and conducting themselves in conformity with that gender. Farmer v. Mortsugu, 163 
F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The American Psychiatric Association defines gender dysphoria as 
“the distress that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced and expressed 
gender and one’s assigned gender.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). 
 6. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 7. When You Don’t Feel at Home With Your Gender, WEBMD (last updated Sept. 9, 
2016), http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/gender-dysphoria?page=3.  
 8. See id.  
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II.  BACKGROUND 
The root issue of legal disputes concerning transgender rights is whether 
gender identity should be included in the definition of sex. The definition of 
sex that is inclusive of gender identity breaks from the traditional definition 
of sex that has historically been guided by physiological distinctions.9 The 
answer to this novel question has caused courts to split. Older court cases 
have excluded gender identity as being a part of the definition of sex, while 
recent court cases have taken an inclusive view of gender identity.10 
Numerous court opinions have argued that the two sexes have been 
differentiated throughout time and society based on biological differences.11 
Title VII claims have been struck down on the grounds that discrimination 
against “a biological male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and 
has surgically altered parts of [his] body to make it appear to be female” is 
not sex discrimination.12 The Seventh Circuit came to this very conclusion 
and reasoned that “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily 
created from what remains of a man,” surgical change into a certain sex 
does not decide cases based on sex discrimination.13 In Ulane, the Seventh 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730.  
 10. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721 (stating the dictionary “definitions also suggest that a hard-
and-fast binary division on the basis of reproductive organs—although useful in most 
cases—was not universally descriptive”).  
 11. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 734 (stating that “[a]cross societies and throughout history, it 
has been commonplace and universally accepted to separate public restrooms, locker rooms, 
and shower facilities on the basis of biological sex in order to address privacy and safety 
concerns arising from the biological differences between males and females”); Johnston v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 672 (W.D. Pa. 2015) 
(holding that because a transgender university student failed to state an Equal Protection 
claim based on his transgender status, the university’s policy of segregating bathroom and 
locker room facilities on the basis of birth sex was “substantially related to a sufficiently 
important government interest” and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause) 
(quoting Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)); Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding discrimination based on a person’s 
transsexual status is not discrimination because gender identity is not a protected class under 
Title VII); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title 
VII does not protect transsexuals); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. 
Ohio 2003) (holding that for an employer to require an employee use only the men’s 
restroom as a transgender male was not sex stereotyping discrimination under Title VII); 
Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that while the plaintiff 
properly stated a violation of Equal Protection based on sex stereotyping, the fact that the 
plaintiff was transgender was not the grounds for the Equal Protection claim). 
 12. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).  
 13. Id.  
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Circuit’s reasoning was guided by the binary differentiation of the sexes 
determined by physiological distinctions.14  
On the other hand, the court in Grimm v. Gloucester  made it clear that 
gender identity should be included in the legal definition of sex.15 The court 
used a definition of sex that is the sum of factors such as a “typical 
dichotomous occurrence” of physical, psychological, and social aspects that 
are typically manifested as male and female.16 In Grimm, the plaintiff, G.G., 
is a high school student who is biologically female and suffers from gender 
dysphoria as a result of the incongruence between her biological sex and 
gender identity.17 G.G.’s therapist recommended that G.G. should change 
her lifestyle to be consistent with her gender identity so that the symptoms 
of her gender dysphoria would not become more severe.18 Acting on that 
advice, G.G.’s family informed the school board that she should be treated 
as a boy by teachers and staff.19  
The school board allowed G.G. to use the boys’ restroom, but this 
decision was met with considerable disdain from the public.20 The public 
outcry caused the school board to recant its decision to allow G.G. to use 
the boys’ restroom and bar G.G. from the boys’ restroom, thus confining 
her to the girls’ and unisex restrooms.21 G.G’s mother brought an action 
against Gloucester High School, challenging the school board’s policy that 
required students to use the restroom consistent with their birth sex rather 
than gender identity.22 The United States District Court of the Eastern 
District of Virginia found that the school board did not violate Title IX by 
limiting transgender students to the use of the restroom consistent with the 
student’s birth sex.23 The court reasoned that restrooms and locker rooms 
are necessarily separate because of the need for privacy due to the 
physiological distinctions between the sexes.24 G.G.’s mother, Deirdre 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. Id.  
 15. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721.  
 16. Id. at 721-22. 
 17. Id. at 715. For the purposes of this Note, pronouns referring to a person’s sex will be 
consistent with that person’s sex as determined by that person’s physiology in accordance 
with the conclusion of this Note which is that sex should be defined by physiology.  
 18. Grimm, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 715-16.  
 19. Id. at 715.  
 20. Id. at 715-16.  
 21. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715-16. 
 22. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (E.D. Va. 
2015).  
 23. Id. at 744. 
 24. Id. at 750. See also Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).  
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Grimm, appealed the ruling, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court.25 The Fourth Circuit adhered to the Department 
of Education’s interpretation of which restroom a transgender individual 
should use.26 The Department of Education’s letter determined that the 
definition of sex includes gender identity.27 According to the letter, a 
student’s gender identity is the student’s sex for purposes of settling Title IX 
disputes.28  
The dissenting opinion in Grimm reasoned correctly as to the legal 
definition of sex. Judge Niemeyer set out the policy reasons for why sex 
should be determined by physiological distinctions rather than gender 
identity.29 He stated that the Constitution calls for the protection of 
personal privacy.30 He reasoned that this privacy is inherent in the nature 
and dignity of mankind, and the separation of restrooms according to 
physiological distinctions is crucial to the protection of this privacy.31 In his 
dissent, Niemeyer used multiple dictionary definitions where the definition 
of sex is shaped by the physiological differences between reproductive 
organs; none of these definitions included gender identity.32 He reasoned 
that if the legal definition of sex could also be the gender a person identifies 
with, then the enforcement of any separation of bathroom facilities would 
be impossible. Such a definition would destroy the Constitution’s 
protection of personal privacy within restrooms.33  
Niemeyer further argued that the inclusion of gender identity in the 
definition of sex would require gender stereotyping, which is exactly what 
the majority opinion sought to avoid.34 The majority opinion argued that 
sex could not be based on a student’s clothing, speech, or mannerisms 
because this would be gender stereotyping.35 However, if gender identity is 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715.  
 26. Id. at 721-23.  
 27. Id. at 721. 
 28. U.S. Departments of Justice and Education Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools 
Ensure the Civil Rights of Transgender Students, DOJ 16-568, 2016 Westlaw 2766271 (May 
13, 2016).  
 29. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730-731 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 30. Id. at 734-35 (citing Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 
2008)). 
 31. Id. (citing Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
 32. Id. at 736-37. 
 33. Id. at 734-35.  
 34. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 35. See id.  
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included in the definition of sex, a school would have to decide which 
students could use certain restroom by assuming the gender identity of a 
student.36 This assumption would be “based on appearances, social 
expectations, or explicit declarations of identity” rather than physiological 
distinctions proven by a birth certificate.37 Judge Niemeyer reasoned that if 
the legal definition of sex for the purposes of segregating restrooms must 
include the gender identity that a student chooses, instead of biological sex, 
then the majority’s position is “at odds with common sense.”38 
Because the Fourth Circuit reversed the finding of the district court, 
Gloucester County School Board petitioned for a writ of certiorari so that 
the case may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The mandate of the Fourth 
Circuit has been stayed, pending timely filing and disposition of a petition 
for a writ of certiorari; however, the issue of whether the definition of sex 
should include or exclude gender identity will not be reviewed.39  
This Note will explain why Niemeyer’s dissent in Grimm was correct. 
The legal definition of sex should be determined by physiological 
distinctions. This Note will argue that there needs to be a legal definition of 
transgender, which should be determined by physiological makeup, because 
transgender physiology is distinguishable from that of the binary sexes. 
Accordingly, gender identity should not control sex.  
This Note will propose a two-step analysis  to determine whether a 
transgender person has standing to sue for sex discrimination. This Note 
will further show how the symptoms of gender dysphoria are analogous to 
those of I.I.E.D. plaintiffs.40 It will argue the courts should not be eager to 
                                                                                                                                      
 36. Id. at 738. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S.Ct. 2442 (2016).  
 40. Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90 (1976) (stating that “‘[t]he law intervenes only 
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The 
intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity’”); 
Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 514-15 (1998) (The plaintiff regularly underwent psychotherapy 
and lived in fear propelling her to buy a bullet proof vest. The plaintiff was treated for anxiety and 
suffered mood changes, insomnia, nightmares, flashbacks of the incident, and symptoms that 
persisted for over two years after the incident. The plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder. The court found these symptoms sufficiently severe.); Decker v. Princeton Packet 
Inc., 116 N.J. 418, 431 (1989) (The plaintiff’s symptoms were not severe because the alleged 
emotional distress approximates the subjective reactions of ordinary persons who feel victimized, 
annoyance, embarrassment, or irritation. Distress not occasioned by conduct that itself was 
egregious or purposeful but rather caused by inadvertent conduct is not severe.); Buckley v. 
Trenton Sav. Fund Soc’y, 111 N.J. 355, 268-69 (1988) (The plaintiff’s symptoms were not 
sufficiently severe because the symptoms were “nothing more than aggravation, embarrassment, 
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give a remedy to transgender persons for their suffering when the court 
disfavors giving a remedy to those who suffer the same degree of emotional 
distress, only from a different source.41 The legal standard of sex should be 
stringent so that the court is not overwhelmed by litigation over 
psychological distress issues, but the standard should not be so strict that 
there is no room to accommodate a transgender person’s needs.42 In order 
to create a workable, yet logical legal definition of sex, the concerns for 
privacy and equality must be balanced.43  
III.  FRAMING THE ISSUE 
A. Gender Identity: A Disorder of Belief 
1. Discrimination Previously Defined by Objectively Apparent 
Physiological Distinctions.  
“There are both real and fictional differences between women and 
men.”44 These differences are at the core of disputes where the definition of 
sex is needed to establish a particular plaintiff’s sex, such as in cases 
determining whether there has been a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                                                      
an unspecified number of headaches, and loss of sleep.”); Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 348 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not establish severe emotional distress 
because there had been no dramatic impact on her everyday activities and her ability to function); 
Griffin v. Tops Appliance City, Inc., 766 A.2d 292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (The plaintiff’s 
symptoms were not severe because the plaintiff “testified [only] “that he ‘felt bad,’” and “[h]is wife 
testified that plaintiff was ‘devastated’ . . . and that ‘[h]is whole personality changed.’”); Twyman v. 
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (utter despair, falling apart, and mental anguish are not 
sufficiently severe to support a finding of severe emotional distress); Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 
262-63 (Tex. App. 2001) (citation omitted) (The law intervenes only where the distress is so severe 
that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. The plaintiff suffered an ulcer, felt 
worthless, ashamed, grinded her teeth so hard that some are cracked, severe depression, suffered 
post-traumatic stress disorder, needed of ongoing treatment after the incident, and years of abuse 
were sufficiently severe to support a finding of severe emotional distress.); Russo v. White, 241 Va. 
23, 28 (1991) (Nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from 
activities which might necessitate plaintiff leaving her daughter at home, [and] lack of 
concentration at work to the point where she received a reprimand was not sufficiently severe to 
support a finding of severe emotional distress.). 
 41. Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 81 (2007) (stating that because of problems inherent in 
proving a tort alleging injury to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying physical 
injury, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not favored in the law).  
 42. Id.  
 43. See generally  Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. 
Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 44. City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).  
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1964 or whether the person has been deprived of equal protection of the 
laws under the U.S. Constitution.45 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
announces “that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to 
the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”46 “[I]ndividuals 
have a right . . . to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex.”47 The 
Fourth Circuit looked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for guidance in 
evaluating the claim brought by G.G. under Title IX alleging discrimination 
based on sex.48  
The definition of sex is a central issue in Title IX cases involving 
transgender people.49 To include gender identity in the legal definition of 
sex would greatly expand the scope of litigation to include disputes over the 
separation of living facilities, locker rooms, shower facilities, and other 
public facilities. 50 For example, in Grimm, the plaintiff’s claim “only 
challenge[d] the definition and application of the term ‘sex’ with respect to 
separate restrooms[; however], accept[ing] [her] argument would 
necessarily change the definition of ‘sex’ for purposes of assigning separate 
living facilities, locker rooms, and shower facilities as well.”51  
Due to the fear of excessive litigation, along with many other policy 
issues, the majority of courts have concluded that discrimination against a 
transgender person based on that person’s gender identity is not sex 
discrimination.52 Only a few courts have been willing to adopt an expansive 
                                                                                                                                      
 45. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964). 
 46. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 U.S. 1775, 1784 (1989).  
 47. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2010).  
 48. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 49. Id. at 721.  
 50. Id. at 715. 
 51. G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 52. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
“discrimination . . . based on [a] person’s status as a transsexual is not discrimination 
because [gender identity is not a protected class] under Title VII”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 
742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (“hold[ing] that Title VII does not protect transsexuals”); 
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 669-70 
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that a transgender student failed to state an Equal Protection claim 
based on his transgender status. The court found that the university’s policy of segregating 
bathroom and locker room facilities on the basis of birth sex was “substantially related to a 
sufficiently important government interest” and therefore did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1305-06 (N.D. Ga. 2010) 
(holding avoiding lawsuits from transgender employees was a rational basis for terminating a 
transgender employee. While the plaintiff properly stated a violation of Equal Protection 
based on sex stereotyping, the fact that the plaintiff was transgender was not the grounds for 
770 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:761 
 
interpretation of sex that would include transgender as a separate protected 
class.53  
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that 
transgender persons are not a protected class under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act.54 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that even sex reassignment 
surgery would not determine that person’s sex in order to become part of a 
protected class.55 The court made the distinction between what a person 
believes her gender to be and the constitutionally protected class of sex.56 
Therefore, in Ulane, the court adhered to the determination that the term 
sex was defined solely as a biological male or a biological female.57  
In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,58 the Ninth Circuit argued—
similar to the Ulane court—that transgender is not a protected class for the 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.59 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
discrimination based on gender identity alone does not constitute sex 
discrimination.60 This conclusion hinged on the concept that if a person is 
born with certain physiological distinctions which constitute a certain sex, 
then that person is that specific sex throughout his or her lifetime.61 The 
takeaway from Holloway is that sex is determined by “‘immutable 
characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth,’ much like race or 
national origin.” 62 For the Ninth Circuit, gender identity is not a factor in 
determining sex.  
In Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of 
Higher Education, the United States District Court of the Western District 
of Pennsylvania stated that “[m]any courts have defined ‘sex’ . . . as the 
biological sex assigned to a person at birth.”63 The court reasoned that “the 
                                                                                                                                      
the Equal Protection claim.); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999-1000 
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that an employer’s requirement that the employee use only the 
men’s restroom as a transgender male was not sex stereotyping discrimination under Title 
VII). 
 53. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.  
 54. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. 
 55. Id. at 1086-87. 
 56. Id. at 1087. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 663 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
 63. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 
670 (W.D. Pa. 2015), appeal dismissed (Mar. 30, 2016).  
2018] DIVERGENCE OF BINARY SEX AND THE TRANSGENDER 771 
 
law [has] recognize[d] certain distinctions between male[s] and female[s] 
on the basis of birth sex.”64 The phrase of Title VII prohibiting 
discrimination is based on the “impl[ication] that it is unlawful to 
discriminate against women because they are women and against men 
because they are men.”65 Therefore, the Johnson court also adhered to the 
common theme that discrimination has historically been decided in the 
context of physiological distinctions which is based on an objective 
standard, not the subjective standard of gender identity.66 
2. Apparent Gender Controlled by the Subjective Standard of Gender 
Identity67 
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County, the Fourth Circuit 
communicated that gender identity is nothing but a subjective belief.68 
Judge Floyd made clear that he believed gender identity is a purely 
subjective standard.69 He stated that gender identity should not be included 
in the legal definition of sex because the plaintiff’s gender identity is in 
“[her] mind. It’s not physical that causes that, it’s what [s]he believes.”70  
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “a prohibition against discrimination 
based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or 
discontent with the sex into which they were born.”71 The Seventh Circuit in 
Ulane described similarly how Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not 
prohibit discrimination against a person with gender identity disorder.72  
In Spearman v. Ford Motor Company, the Seventh Circuit supported and 
utilized Ulane’s reasoning in its decision, stating that Ulane’s rule regarding 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is still continuing in vitality. 73 The term 
gender identity disorder comes from the state of “a profound divergence 
between an individual’s assigned birth sex and the person’s inner gender 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. Id. at 671.  
 65. Id. (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 66. Id. at 675-76. 
 67. Prabhat S., Difference between Transgender and Transsexual, DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN.NET, http://www.differencebetween.net/science/difference-between-transgender-
and-transsexual/ (last visited on Sept. 16, 2017). 
 68. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 726.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).  
 73. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Ulane v. 
E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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identity.”74 The court in Spearman noted, regardless of the interplay 
between the two concepts, there is a distinction between birth sex and 
gender identity.75  
The court in Kasti v. Maricopa evaluated three factors in determining a 
person’s sex: “(1) phenotypic characteristics; (2) endogenous hormonal 
characteristics; and (3) chromosomal characteristics.”76 For a majority of 
courts, the underlying basis of sex are the physiological differences between 
males and females, not a subjective belief.77 A subjective determination of 
sex is not a good legal standard because “Congress[, in passing the Civil 
Rights Act,] intended the term ‘sex’ to mean biological male or biological 
female” so the courts should defer to Congress and adopt a narrow 
interpretation of the word sex to exclude a transgender person’s 
determining her own sex based solely on gender identity.78  
B. Competing Values: The Transgender and the Right to Privacy 
1. The Transgender Person’s Difficult Plight Regarding Restroom 
Choice 
For most students, choosing a restroom is a simple decision. However, 
for transgender students, it is a very hard decision. Whichever restroom is 
chosen, the transgender person faces potential harassment or violence.79 In 
a survey conducted by Dylan Vade, 48 of 116 transgender people responded 
with stories detailing specific restroom experiences ranging from “being 
physically abused, verbally harassed, fired, arrested, [or being] ill from 
avoiding restrooms altogether.80 Recent statistics show that one-in-four 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. Stacy v. LSI Corp, 544 Fed. Appx. 93, 94-95 (3d. Cir. 2013).  
 75. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 
(7th Cir. 1984)). 
 76. Kasti v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 
2460636 at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006), aff'd, 325 F. App'x 492 (9th Cir. 2009) . 
 77. Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 
(S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003). 
 78. Id. (emphasis added).; see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999 
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984)); 
Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 
1984)). 
 79. Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation of 
Gender and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE L.J. 65, 67 (2013), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Gendered-Restrooms-
and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf.  
 80. Id. (citing Dylan Vade, Gender Neutral Bathroom Survey, 
http://archive.srlp.org/files/ documents/toolkit/gnb_survey.pdf). 
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transgender persons “has faced a bias-driven assault” and these rates are 
even higher for transgender women and people of color.81  
Transgender persons also face rising threats of violence.82 Grade levels 
for transgender students are starkly lower than other students due to the 
frequent harassment and bullying from other students.83 Therefore, the 
transgender person’s plight in choosing a restroom is a catch twenty-two—
whichever bathroom a transgender person chooses, he or she is left with 
negative consequences.84 
In Grimm, the plaintiff had similar restroom concerns.85 G.G’s complaint 
stated that when the school board adopted a restroom policy that forced her 
to either use the gender neutral or girls’ bathroom, she felt as if she had 
been “stripped of [her] privacy and dignity.”86 G.G. stated that the gender 
neutral bathrooms made her feel stigmatized and isolated because all of her 
peers knew that the restroom was installed specifically for her as a 
transgender.87 The separate restroom served as a daily reminder that the 
school viewed her as different and it placed her in a humiliating position 
that “accentuat[ed her] ‘otherness.’”88  
Such isolation for the transgender individual creates “severe and 
persistent emotional and social harms.”89 The expert testimony from Dr. 
Ettner in Grimm stated that G.G. was “place[d] . . . at [an] extreme risk for 
immediate and long-term psychological harm.90 For G.G., the emotional 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2015), 
http://www.transequality.org/issues/anti-violence.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Tonei Glavinic, Research Shows Lack of Support for Transgender and Gender-
Nonconforming Youth in U.S. School Systems, 2 INQUIRIES JOURNAL 1(2010) 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/135/research-shows-lack-of-support-for-
transgender-and-gender-nonconforming-youth-in-us-school-systems.  
 84. See Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation 
of Gender and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE L.J. 65, 67 
(2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Gendered-
Restrooms-and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf. 
 85. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 2016), 
vacated, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (2017). 
 86. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 749 (E.D. Va. 
2015). 
 87. Id. at 741. 
 88. Id. at 728. 
 89. See id. at 717. 
 90. Id. at 728. 
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harm festered into acute physical harm. She suffered multiple urinary tract 
infections because she avoided using the restroom at school.91  
In order to lessen the effects of having gender dysphoria, some 
transgender students receive treatment for the disorder.92 One part of this 
treatment is living consistently with one’s gender identity, which means 
using the restroom that matches one’s gender identity.93 This treatment 
involves mental health counseling, hormone treatment, speech and 
language therapy, and peer groups to support living consistently with one’s 
gender identity.94 One of the purposes of this treatment is to help the 
transgender person lessen the psychological distress that accompanies 
gender dysphoria.95  
In Grimm, G.G. argued that she cannot use the restroom that matches 
her biological sex because it would cause her severe psychological distress, 
which “would be incompatible with [her] treatment for gender 
dysphoria.”96 The severe psychological distress would stem from negative 
reactions from those in the restroom. G.G. argued that she would be 
psychologically harmed by those who would perceive her as being the 
opposite sex in the wrong restroom.97  
The concurring opinion of Judge Davis insisted that G.G. be able to 
access the restroom consistent with her gender identity because she would 
suffer greater harm, as a transgender, than the other students.98 Davis stated 
that there would be minimal or even non-existent hardship to other 
students for them to use the single-stall restrooms if they objected to a 
transgender student’s presence in the communal restroom.99 Davis further 
argued that not allowing a transgender student to use the restroom of his or 
her choice, rather than a unisex bathroom, would cause more harm than 
requiring students who object to a transgender person’s presence in a 
communal restroom to use a unisex restroom.100 The dissent in Grimm 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. at 727.  
 92. See, e.g., Grimm, 822 F.3d at 727 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 93. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. 
Va. 2015).  
 94. Gender dysphoria – Treatment, NHS CHOICES (Dec. 4, 2016) 
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Gender-dysphoria/Pages/Treatment.aspx.  
 95. See id.  
 96. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 716. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 729 (Davis, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 729 (Davis, J., concurring). 
 100. Id.  
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discussed the opposite problem, in that if the transgender male were 
allowed to use the boys restroom, the boys would have similar feelings with 
a biological female entering and using the bathroom.101 Therefore, the 
transgender is not welcome in either restroom that is separated by the 
binary form of sex.102 
2. The Common Student’s Right to Privacy in School Restrooms.  
There is an underlying competition of interests at stake between the 
transgender person’s right to the public facilities of his or her choosing and 
the community’s traditional understanding of sex-specific bathrooms.103 
The transgender person’s interest is to avoid being forced to use a restroom 
when he or she does not identify with that restroom’s biological 
designation.104 The community’s interest is keeping the universally accepted 
protections of privacy and safety based on the anatomical differences 
between the sexes.105  
The Johnson court stated that “at the heart of [a] case” concerning a 
transgender student’s right to the restroom of his or her choice “are two 
important but competing interests.”106 One is the transgender person’s 
“interest in performing some of life’s most basic and routine functions, 
which take place in restrooms and locker rooms, in an environment 
consistent with [his or her] gender identity.”107 The other interest is the 
school’s “interest in providing its students with a safe and comfortable 
environment for performing these same life functions consistent with 
society’s long-held tradition of performing such functions in sex-segregated 
spaces based on biological or birth sex.”108 In order to decide the case, the 
court must weigh a delicate balance of interests in favor of each party to the 
dispute. The court in Johnston upheld the policy that a school must “ensure 
the privacy of its students to disrobe . . . outside of the presence of members 
of the opposite sex.” 109 Accordingly, there is a delicate balance of interests 
that needs to be weighed. 
                                                                                                                                      
 101. Id. at 730-31 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 102. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730-31. 
 103. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 
668 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
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 109. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 669. 
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The Eighth Circuit has sought to balance the two opposing interests of 
the transgender plaintiff and the collective.110 The Johnston court stated that 
Title IX clearly permits schools to provide students with certain sex-
segregated spaces to perform certain private activities and bodily functions 
consistent with an individual’s physiological distinctions.111 Therefore, the 
court made known that this balance of opposing forces must cling to the 
policy behind the traditional separation of restrooms by physiological 
distinctions in that persons with a certain physiology should not be subject 
to exposure to persons with opposite physiology.112  
With this policy in view, the transgender person’s subjective belief of 
gender tends to be a peripheral concern to the central issue of privacy. The 
policy of separating people by sex would be nullified if people chose a 
bathroom in accordance with their understanding of their own gender, 
regardless of whether their physiology was male or female.113 The common 
man’s right to privacy in a restroom would be void.114 Therefore, the two 
interests are diametrically opposed.  
C. G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board 
1. The Majority View as to the Definition of Sex is a Sum of 
Morphological Peculiarities.  
The majority opinion in Grimm took on the daunting task of defining 
the term sex.115 The Fourth Circuit begins its analysis by stating the well-
settled rule that Title IX permits separate living spaces for the different 
sexes, and that the Department of Education’s regulation permits the 
separation of bathroom facilities.116 The Department’s Office of Civil Rights 
gave guidance on how to determine which restroom a transgender should 
use while at school.117 The Office of Civil Rights required schools to treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.118 The Fourth 
Circuit determined that the guidance was silent as to whether a transgender 
                                                                                                                                      
 110. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).  
 111. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672-73.  
 112. Id. at 668. 
 113. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (2017). 
 114. Id. at 737. 
 115. Id. at 721 (majority opinion). 
 116. Id. at 718.  
 117. Id. at 715. 
 118. Id. at 718. 
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person is male or female.119 It also stated that the term sex is ambiguous as 
used in the guidance letter.120  
The Court next proceeded to define the term sex.121 The Court first 
looked to the dictionary definition of sex as it first was defined during the 
era in which Title IX was promulgated: 
[T]he sum of the morphological, physiological, and behavioral 
peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental 
reproduction with its concomitant genetic segregation and 
recombination which underlie most evolutionary change, that in 
its typical dichotomous occurrence is usu[ally] genetically 
controlled and associated with special sex chromosomes, and 
that is typically manifested as maleness and femaleness . . . .122  
The court used this definition to show that the concept of maleness and 
femaleness, being distinct from each other solely through a binary fashion, 
is not correct.123 A definition based on reproductive organs was not 
universally descriptive.124 The court used this definition to allow leeway for 
those who may have a chromosome or reproductive organ disorder.125 
Implicit in the majority’s reasoning is the idea that transgender should be 
defined as a specific category itself, rather than fitting into one of the binary 
sexes.126 
The court rejected the bright line rule that sex has always been what is 
traditionally manifested as maleness and femaleness. Instead, the court 
argued that a person’s sex should be dependent upon the various physical, 
psychological, and social aspects of a person.127 A transgender person is 
determined by the sum of the person’s “morphological, physiological, and 
behavioral peculiarities.”128 This definition connotes that the foundation of 
sex is not physiological characteristics, but rather that a person’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 119. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 720. 
 120. Id. at 720 (stating that the guidance is susceptible to both the Board’s reading that 
sex is determined by exclusive reference to genitalia or the department’s interpretation that 
sex is determined by gender identity).  
 121. Id. at 721.  
 122. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S THIRD 
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physiological characteristics is simply a factor among many that determine 
a person’s sex.129 
The court used a dictionary to define sex simply as a sum of those 
anatomical and physiological differences with reference to which the male 
and female are distinguished.130 The court argued that if sex is simply a sum 
of differences, then one person’s “sum” may be different than the traditional 
male or female sum of factors.131 The court reasoned that manifestations of 
maleness and femaleness typically evidence maleness and femaleness, but 
since sex is made up of a host of factors, the binary definition of sex simply 
does not work.132 The court determined that since the physical, 
psychological, and social aspects of a human being are always changing, 
there is room for the biological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities 
of the transgender to be included in the definition of sex.133 Gender identity 
is now an important factor in what makes a person a particular sex. 
2. The Dissenting Opinion’s View as to the Definition of Sex as 
Physiological Differences Between Males and Females.  
The underlying theme of Judge Niemeyer’s dissent is that if the majority 
opinion’s definition of sex prevails, then traditional Title IX separation 
based on sex will be abolished.134 Niemeyer stated that the majority opinion 
is not based on case law.135 The majority opinion relied solely on the Office 
of Civil Rights letter, which is not law, but simply an interpretation of the 
law by the Executive Branch.136 The dissent made it clear that instead of 
solving the sex definition dispute, the letter from the Office of Civil Rights 
letter made the standard for treatment of transgender students even more 
confusing than before:  
In one sentence it states that schools ‘generally must treat 
transgender students consistent with their gender identity,’ 
whatever that means, and in the next sentence, it encourages 
schools to provide ‘gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to 
                                                                                                                                      
 129. Id. at 721-22. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721-22. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 722-23.  
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any student who does not want to use shared sex-segregated 
facilities.137 
Niemeyer made it clear that the majority ventured into dangerous 
territory in order to prescribe this new definition of sex, thereby unraveling 
the definition that has been accepted and maintained order in society 
throughout history.138 The majority may, for the first time ever, hold that a 
school may not separate its restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of 
sex.139 Niemeyer spoke of the gravity and weight of the majority decision. 
He stated that the majority opinion “completely tramples on all universally 
accepted protections of privacy and safety that are based on the anatomical 
differences between the sexes.”140  
Niemeyer refuted the majority opinion by giving numerous examples in 
case law that state that sex must be determined by physiological differences 
between males and females, not a subjective gender identity: 
Across societies and throughout history, it has been 
commonplace and universally accepted to separate public 
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
biological sex in order to address privacy and safety concerns 
arising from the biological differences between males and 
females. An individual has a legitimate and important interest in 
bodily privacy such that his or her nude or partially nude body . . 
. are not exposed to persons of the opposite biological sex. 
Indeed, courts have consistently recognized that the need for 
such privacy is inherent in the nature and dignity of 
humankind.141 
“The right to bodily privacy is fundamental,” and students have a 
significant privacy interest in their bodies.142 Niemeyer noted “that [the] 
separati[on of] restrooms based on ‘acknowledged differences’ [between 
males and females] serves to protect this . . . privacy interest [in one’s 
body].”143 This privacy interest will remain because of the inherent physical 
differences between men and women, which are enduring and render the 
                                                                                                                                      
 137. Id. at 738.  
 138. Id. at 730.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 734.  
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two sexes nonfungible.144 The policy is to protect physical bodies, because 
inherent physicality is at the root of the meaning of sex.145 The interests of 
transgender persons must not prevail if they are based solely on a subjective 
belief and if the consequences to transgender persons are solely 
psychological. 
Niemeyer noted that the majority opinion accepted the definition of sex 
as including gender identity only to meet a particular plaintiff’s needs.146 
The new definition of sex is an extreme measure designed to rationalize a 
desired outcome that is unsupported by the law.147 The majority was swayed 
by the idea that this new definition of sex would only apply to restrooms; 
however, Niemeyer pointed out that the canons of statutory construction 
will force this new definition to be applied uniformly throughout Title IX, 
thereby opening it up to locker rooms and shower facilities.148 Therefore, 
while the majority’s new definition of sex will remedy a particular plaintiff’s 
needs, the ramifications and consequences of this new definition will result 
in chaos for the collective.  
Niemeyer then presented his argument based on dictionary 
definitions.149 He cited seven dictionaries that, when defining sex, all refer to 
physiological distinctions or reproductive organs.150 Niemeyer stated that 
even today, Webster’s dictionary defines sex based on these same 
physiological distinctions between males and females.151 The dissenting 
opinion showed that majority opinion is unsupported by case law, logic, 
and results in an unworkable outcome.152  
Finally, Niemeyer demonstrated that the majority’s definition of sex as 
gender identity cannot coexist with the longstanding rule that restrooms 
should be separated by sex.153 If the majority opinion is interpreted to mean 
that the term sex refers to both biological sex and gender identity, then the 
transgender person could go into neither the girls nor boys restroom.154 
This is because a transgender person, by definition, has a gender identity 
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different than that person’s sex.155 Therefore, the transgender could not 
fulfill the conjunctive criteria that both a person’s sex and gender identity 
must be in union to enter a restroom defined by either male or female.156 If 
the majority’s definition of sex is interpreted to mean either biological sex 
or gender identity, then a transgender student could use either the restroom 
of their biological sex or of their gender identity.157 The majority argued for 
the definition of sex as only gender identity, but this definition would 
totally abolish the longstanding separation of restrooms by biological sex.158 
If sex is determined by a person’s subjective determination of their own 
gender, then there would be no way to implement a separation of 
restrooms.159 This is because a person’s gender identity could vacillate and 
in one moment a person could determine that he or she is male and enter 
the male restroom, only to change their mind in in the next moment and 
decide to be female and enter the female restroom.160 
The dissent further argued that the new definition could only be policed 
by gender stereotyping. 161 Since there is no way to know what a person’s 
subjective gender is when he or she enters a restroom, the only way to 
determine if he or she truly identifies as that sex is to assume that person’s 
sex based on appearances, social expectations, or explicit declarations of 
biological sex.162 Niemeyer argued that “by interpreting Title IX and the 
regulations as ‘requiring schools to treat students consistent with their 
gender identity,’ and by disallowing schools from treating students based on 
their biological sex, the government’s position would . . . be at odds with 
common sense.”163 The government argued that gender stereotyping is an 
inappropriate way of determining which students will be allowed into a 
specific restroom, despite its virtually assured reliance on such stereotyping 
to implement the decision.164 
The majority responded to this argument by stating that the dissent’s 
definition of sex is no less of an adoption of gender stereotyping than the 
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majority opinion’s definition of sex.165 Both the dissenting and majority 
definitions failed to resolve the issue of gender stereotyping. They both 
assumed a person’s sex based on appearances, social expectations, or 
explicit declarations of biological sex.166 However, the dissenting opinion’s 
definition of sex allows for a greater probability of a remedy after a 
transgender person’s rights to a restroom have been breached. This is 
because a standard based on physiological distinctions provides clear 
guidance on the rights that have been violated and the conduct that is 
prohibited.  
IV.  VIABLE SOLUTIONS 
A transgender person’s subjective gender originates in the mind. In 
Grimm, members of the community spoke at a Citizen’s Comment Period 
held by the County School Board and expressed concerns about allowing 
the plaintiff’s beliefs about her gender identity to be determine which 
restroom she was allowed to use.167 The members of the community were 
concerned that this standard could produce chaotic results.168 While the 
community expressed harsh critiques of this standard, the transgender 
plaintiff was not the main focus of the public’s concern; rather, the hostility 
of the community focused on the possible abuse of this standard by other 
students.169  
The main issue with the school board’s regulation that allowed 
transgender students to enter the restroom of their choice was that the rule 
had to be enforced equally among the transgender students and non-
transgender students alike.170 This would allow all students to migrate 
between restrooms, depending on their particular gender identity at that 
time, and would give expansive freedom to all students to abuse the 
newfound rule.171 A community member voiced the concern that a student 
who is not actually transgender would have the right to use the restroom of 
his choice without restraint.172 This could result in harassment, bullying, 
violence, and even sexual assault for all students. The community was 
concerned that allowing students to choose the restroom of their choice 
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based on subjective belief would degrade the historical tradition of 
separation of restrooms and jeopardize privacy and safety. The underlying 
concern is that if the choice of restroom is left up to the transgender person 
based on subjective belief alone, the person could identify as a female one 
day and identify as a male the next. The dissent concluded that defining sex 
by gender identity would necessarily endanger the privacy rights of all 
students in school restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities, because 
the new definition “would have to be applied uniformly throughout [Title 
IX].”173  
The courts should not adopt a subjective standard, but rather, the courts 
should eliminate these dire consequences by requiring an objective 
standard.174 The courts should be wary of a shifting standard. In fact, courts 
have always expressed deep concern over purely subjective standards.175 
Courts should adopt an objective standard for three reasons: (1) to give 
notice of the prohibited conduct;176 (2) to ease the duty of the court and jury 
to determine the wrongfulness of the conduct and the severity of the burden 
on the transgender;177 and (3) to limit frivolous lawsuits by individuals with 
merely hurt feelings.178 These three reasons can be analyzed through the 
analogous lens of the tort of I.I.E.D. In fact, the claims of the victim of 
transgender discrimination and the victim of intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress mirror one another in their subjective symptoms.179  
A.The Courts Must Adopt an Objective Standard to Give Notice of What 
Conduct is Prohibited. 
The courts should create a rule to determine a person’s sex by that 
person’s objective physiological characteristics in order to clearly define 
what the prohibited conduct is, and how a person can avoid it.180 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia in Almy v. Grisham stated that the tort of 
I.I.E.D. is disfavored in the law because the prohibited conduct cannot be 
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defined objectively.181 Similarly, if a person’s status as a transgender 
individual is merely a subjective choice, then there is no objective 
component that defines the prohibited conduct. The courts should give the 
public notice as to who is legally recognizable as transgender so that a 
transgender person knows whether he or she is unlawfully entering a 
restroom.  
One of the issues in Grimm was how a public school should determine 
whether a transgender person is a male or a female for the purpose of 
accessing the restroom.182 The majority found that there was ambiguity in 
the Department of Education’s regulation because the regulation could be 
interpreted to mean that “maleness or femaleness” is determined either 
“with reference exclusively to genitalia” or “with reference to gender 
identity.”183 The court reviewed an extensive list of questions to determine 
what makes a person physiologically transgender.184 These questions 
included: (1) “which restroom would a transgender individual who had 
undergone sex-reassignment surgery use?”185 (2) “[w]hat about an intersex 
individual?”186 (3) “[w]hat about an individual born with X-X-Y sex 
chromosomes?”187 (4) “[w]hat about an individual who lost external 
genitalia in an accident?”188 The majority opinion used these questions to 
show that the regulation was ambiguous. However, these questions also 
show that even the majority opinion sought some objective standard to 
determine the sex of a transgender person.189 If the court agreed that a 
transgender person’s sex should be defined by a person’s subjective gender 
identity, then the court would have asked questions based on a subjective 
standard, rather than attacking the ambiguity with objective physiological 
standards.190  
This list of questions begs for a rule that emphatically states that 
transgender is a separate and distinct sex.191 It provides an objective 
determination of the definition of transgender. It is also this list of questions 
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that should be the basis for analysis by a court to determine whether a 
person is male, female, or transgender. If the definition of sex is the 
physiological distinctions between males and females, then the definition of 
transgender should be the physiological distinctions between the 
transgender person and the binary sexes.192 “The two sexes are not 
fungible.”193 Neither are the transgender and the binary sexes.  
The definition of a transgender person should be controlled by either 
skewed chromosome count, sex-reassignment surgery, intersexuality, or 
other physiological differences that exclude a person from fitting into either 
category of male or female.194 Through this objective standard, all persons 
would be able to determine what the prohibited conduct is, and how to 
avoid that prohibited conduct by accessing the restroom that matches the 
sex that corresponds to their physiology.  
B. The Courts Must Adopt an Objective Standard to Ease the Duty of the 
Court and Jury to Determine the Wrongful Conduct and Severity of the 
Burden on the Transgender. 
In Russo v. White, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that a primary 
reason that the tort of I.I.E.D. is disfavored is because clear guidance is 
lacking to those who must evaluate whether certain alleged conduct satisfies 
all elements of the tort.195 A dissenting opinion in Twyman v. Twyman 
stated that the tort should not be adopted in Texas because (1) “judges and 
juries are guided by insufficient standards”; (2) “liability may be imposed 
arbitrarily”; (3) “reported cases . . . disclose no uniform patterns”; and (4) 
“the sensitivities of aggrieved people are entirely too subjective and 
unpredictable.”196  
The same concerns that arise in adjudicating I.I.E.D. cases also confront 
courts adjudicating a claim brought by a transgender person based on his or 
her subjective sense of identity. The courts and juries would be faced with 
the amorphous task of determining whether the transgender person truly 
identified with the gender identity that matched a restroom’s designated 
sex.197  
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In order to satisfy the tort of I.I.E.D., the Supreme Court of Virginia has 
required an objective standard of physical injury. 198 The purpose of such a 
standard was to foreclose the uncertain and speculative nature of the tort. 
Because the same type of speculation would be present in the claim that a 
person is a certain gender identity, the same type of objective physical 
manifestation of that identity should be required. If the transgender person 
were legally defined by physiological distinctions, courts and juries would 
have a way to measure gender identity. They could do so through a variety 
of means, including the use of medical records to prove these physiological 
distinctions. Unlike medical records proving gender dysphoria, medical 
records that show physiological distinctions prove a person’s sex could give 
that person the right to access a restroom designated for individuals of that 
biological sex. Therefore, the courts should use the physiological standard 
when deciding this issue.199  
The physiological standard used to define a transgender person as a 
separate sex determined by physiological features would give the 
transgender person a dependable claim. It would also give the courts a 
baseline standard that would help decide a case regarding transgender 
rights. If the subjective standard of the transgender person’s self-
determination is the only standard on which the definition of sex is 
founded, it would result in excessive litigation. As the dissent in Grimm 
stated, the separation of restrooms based on sex will be impossible.200 There 
would be no way to distinguish one sex from the other.201 It is impossible to 
know an individual’s subjective gender identity when that person enters a 
restroom.202  
Using a subjective standard would result in many lawsuits launched both 
by people believing that someone has entered the wrong restroom, and by 
people who are asked to leave a restroom to which they rightly identify. If 
the physiological standard is used, the risk of either type of lawsuit will be 
reduced. A transgender person who is asked to leave a certain restroom 
would have medical records to show in court that he or she is a legally 
cognizable transgender person. Therefore, the objective definition of a 
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transgender person would give clear guidance to the courts and juries as to 
a transgender person’s rights to access the restroom of his or her choice. 
C. The Courts Should Adopt an Objective Standard for Injury to Limit 
Frivolous Lawsuits Where There are Merely Hurt Feelings Involved. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia laid down a principle for I.I.E.D. cases 
that could also guide the analysis of the definition of sex in the transgender 
restroom conflict.203 In order to state a claim for I.I.E.D., there are four 
elements that must be satisfied.204 One of the elements is severe emotional 
distress.205 This element is “aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding 
litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are 
involved.”206 The “hurt feelings” hurdle has proved to be a high standard to 
pass.207  
In Russo v. White, the Court found that nervousness, sleep deprivation, 
stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from activities, and inability to 
concentrate at work failed to show a “type of extreme emotional distress 
that is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure 
it.”208 The Supreme Court of Virginia was not clear as to whether these 
symptoms constitute “hurt feelings,” but the Court’s ruling makes clear that 
the policy underlying the element of severe emotional distress is not 
satisfied by these traits.209  
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In Twyman, the Supreme Court of Texas found that “utter despair” and 
“[falling] apart” did not constitute severe emotional distress in order to 
satisfy the tort.210 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Taylor v. Metzger 
reasoned that the plaintiff’s emotional distress could be enough to convince 
a factfinder that she had severe emotional distress when she underwent 
psychotherapy, lived in fear which induced her to buy self-defense gear, and 
was treated for anxiety.211 The plaintiff also experienced nightmares of the 
incident, her symptoms lasted for two years, and she was diagnosed as 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.212 In Buckley v. Trenton, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a plaintiff’s “complaints 
amount[ing] to nothing more than aggravation, 
embarrassment, . . . headaches, and loss of sleep” were not sufficiently 
severe to satisfy the requirements of the tort.213 Therefore, emotional 
distress, according to the 46 states that recognize the tort of I.I.E.D., must be 
severe and objectively ascertainable.214 
The plaintiff in Grimm gave a list of her symptoms that included feeling 
as though her dignity and privacy had been stripped; feeling stigmatized 
and isolated; feeling humiliated; feeling set apart from peers; being at 
extreme risk for immediate and long-term psychological harm; and, finally, 
refraining from performing certain bodily functions, which led to short 
term illness.215 Taking into account the precedent set by the tort of I.I.E.D., 
G.G.’s symptoms did not reach the level of severe emotional distress 
required for the court to remedy these injuries.216  
The standard for a remedial transgender injury should be something 
equal to or more than the emotional distress needed to satisfy a basic tort. 
The symptoms that the transgender individual suffers would not be 
sufficient for recovery if alleged under similar tort law; therefore, the 
transgender individual should be held to the same standard. While the 
plaintiff in Grimm experienced psychological harm and physical harm, 
because this harm would not be sufficient for recovery under I.I.E.D. , the 
courts should not intervene.217  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The definition of sex should remain the bright line rule that it has been 
throughout time—the physiological distinctions between males and 
females.218 Transgender should be a new branch within the definition of sex 
that is based on physiological distinctions between transgender people and 
the binary sexes. In other words, the legal definition of sex should include 
three branches: male, female, and transgender. The legal definition of 
transgender should not be an individual’s subjective sense of gender 
identity.219 A claim of transgender discrimination based solely on subjective 
beliefs and psychological distress would cause uncertainty and speculation 
on the part of the court, the factfinder, and the person seeking to avoid the 
unlawful conduct.  
The courts should determine a claim by a transgender person by first 
determining whether the person is a transgender person as physiologically 
and legally defined; and second, by determining whether the injury is 
sufficient as a matter of law. The extent of the injury should be determined 
through the lens of the claim for I.I.E.D. The symptoms alleged by the 
transgender plaintiff are analogous to those alleged by an I.I.E.D. plaintiff.220  
Analogous reasoning based on I.I.E.D analysis is crucial to analyzing the 
policy underlying transgender discrimination claims.221 The policy for the 
requirements of a cause of action for I.I.E.D. is that the courts should not 
have to decide cases based on “hurt feelings.”222 The same is true for 
transgender discrimination. If a transgender person brings a claim to court 
that he or she has been discriminated against based on his or her 
transgender status, premised on a psychic injury and evidenced by nothing 
more than personal beliefs and psychological injuries, he or she is likely to 
lose the case. It is possible that such a person may not even have standing in 
court.  
On the other hand, if the transgender person can survive the two-step 
analysis set forth in this Note, he or she will have a successful claim of 
discrimination based on his or her transgender status. First, the individual 
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must demonstrate that he or she is a legally recognized transgender person 
with the requisite physiological characteristics: having a skewed 
chromosome count, having undergone sex-reassignment surgery, being 
intersex, or having another physiological difference that excludes a person 
from fitting into either category of male or female. The second step of the 
analysis is that the transgender individual must have a sufficient injury 
resulting from being discriminated against. After proving these two steps, 
the transgender individual should be allowed into the restroom of the sex 
that matches his or her physiology. If the transgender person is not allowed 
to enter, the transgender person should be able to recover for his or her 
injury in court, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the injury has in fact occurred. 
 
